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SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DISABILITY
DISCREPANCIES: THE DEBATE BETWEEN STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRATS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
ERICA M.WOEHL*

ABSTRACT
In practice, attorneys know that it is hard to get awards at the initial
stages of the Social Security application process, but the chances of
receiving benefits increase once the applicant gets a hearing in front of an
administrative law judge. This is common practice and typically how the
system works, but should it be how the system works? The Social Security
Administration’s administration of benefits differs both vertically within the
disability adjudicative system and horizontally in different regions, states,
and judicial districts. This article explores a study of how role discretion,
based on hierarchical position in the Social Security Administration’s
application and appeals process, affects the overall success of applicants.
More specifically, the study concentrates on a state’s political control,
workloads, and a state’s financial contributions to the benefit award
program and the effects of these factors on the percent of awards
administrative law judges are responsible for granting.
After running an Ordinary Least Squares regression, the study found
that overall state political controls, workload demands, and a state’s
financial contribution to the benefit awards program have an effect on the
percent of awards administrative law judges are responsible for granting.
Particularly, the study found that the initial workload of street-level
bureaucrats has a negative relationship with the percent of awards
administrative law judges are responsible for granting. Furthermore, the
study found that the workload of administrative law judges has a positive
relationship with the percent of awards administrative law judges are
responsible for granting. This study therefore suggests that workload may
be contributing to the discrepancies in the Social Security Administration’s
disability awards process.
* Erica M. Woehl graduated from the University of North Dakota with a Juris Doctorate
and a Master of Public Administration in 2014. The underlying research in this article was
conducted for her final independent study before receiving her Master’s degree. Erica gives the
most immediate thanks to the Honorable Alvin O. Boucher for the inspiration and to Dr. Andy
Hultquist for his guidance and assistance.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Ask a social security disability attorney what an applicant’s chances are
for receiving benefits and he will tell you, “We just have to keep appealing
and request a hearing.” In practice, attorneys know that it is hard to get
awards at the initial stages of the application process, but the chances of
receiving benefits increase once the applicant gets a hearing in front of an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). This is common practice and typically
how the system works, but should it be how the system works? Is this
discrepancy a strategy by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) to
award less benefits or is something within the administrative process
broken?
The Social Security Disability application and appeals process can be
broken down into five stages.1
The first two stages, the initial
determination and the reconsideration, are handled by bureaucratic level
decision makers.2 The initial determination and the reconsideration both
follow a rigid template of questions in order to make the decision.3 The
third stage, an administrative hearing conducted by an ALJ, allows for a bit

1. Hugo Benítez-Silva, Mosche Buchinsky & John Rust, How Large Are the Classification
Errors in the Social Security Disability Award Process? 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. W10219, Jan. 2004), http://www nber.org/papers/w10219.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 7-8.
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more flexibility and discretion.4 The applicant then has the chance to
appeal first to a review council and lastly to the federal courts.5
The Social Security Administration is inconsistent in its application of
the law, both vertically within the disability adjudicative system and
horizontally in different regions and judicial districts.6 If decisions can vary
so greatly from the initial determinations to the appeals level, and
differently from state to state, what does that say about the discretionary
roles of the employees? In order to answer some of these questions, this
study explores how role discretion, based on hierarchical position in the
Social Security Administration’s application and appeals process, affects
the overall success of applicants.
Research in this area has noted the disparity in the decisions among
differing states and between different adjudicating levels;7 however, no
research has pointed to why such disparities exist. These disparities raise
an alarming question: Why is there such a discrepancy among the initial
stages of determination and the determinations by an ALJ? In an attempt to
answer this question, data was compiled from the Social Security
Administration and organized by state in order to determine the percentage
of the overall appeals rate in each state.8 The unit of analysis is each state.
The study considered the roles state political control, state Social Security
funding and administration, and caseload demands have on applicant appeal
success rates.
If the reasons for these disparities are noted, then they can be fixed in
order to better apply the laws more consistently. Furthermore, if the initial
determination or subsequent reconsideration is handled properly, then it
saves the Social Security Administration time and money. Implementing
new policies nationwide would solidify a standard by which benefits can be
distributed equally among states. In order to better understand the
significance of answering these questions, this article will briefly discuss
the structure of the Social Security Disability’s application and appeal
process in Part II. Part III will then discuss the previous research in this
area. Finally, Parts IV and V will outline the methodology, findings,
analysis, and conclusion.

4. See id. at 9.
5. Id.
6. Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social
Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, 760 (2003).
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8. See infra Table A1.
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II. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
The Social Security Act was amended in 1956 to provide cash benefits
to former workers who could demonstrate their inability to continue gainful
employment.9 This amendment created two new programs: the Social
Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) program and the Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”).10 To qualify for SSDI, recipients must have paid
into Social Security a minimum amount determined by their age and
employment history, and for SSI, recipients must meet a means test.11 Both
programs are federally funded, and the federal government determines the
rules for eligibility of the benefits.12
After applying for benefits, a person’s application is sent to one of the
fifty-four Disability Determination Services (“DDS”) centers.13 After filing
an application, applicants will receive an initial determination.14 If the
applicant receives an unfavorable decision, he can make a request for
reconsideration.15 Initial determinations and requests for reconsideration
determinations are both made by the same DDS, which are state-level
bureaucracies.16
These first two stages use a five-step determination process to test if
applicants qualify for benefits.17 The first step is to determine whether or
not the person has engaged in substantial gainful activity subsequent to the
claimed onset of the disability.18 If not, the street-level bureaucrat explores
whether or not the applicant is severely impaired.19 If the applicant is
severely impaired, the third step consists of a determination of whether the
applicant’s impairment meets the criteria of 1 of over 100 standardized
impairments.20 The last two steps ask if the applicant has a capacity to do
9. Lael R. Keiser, State Bureaucratic Discretion and the Administration of Social Welfare
Programs: The Case of Social Security Disability, 9 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 87, 90
(1999).
10. Id.
11. Lael R. Keiser, Understanding Street-level Bureaucrats’ Decision Making: Determining
Eligibility in the Social Security Disability Program, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 247, 248 (2010).
12. RALPH DOLGOFF, DONALD FELDSTEIN & LOUISE SKOLNIK, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL
WELFARE: A SEARCH FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 202-203 (Linda W. Witzling & Susan L Alkana eds.,
3d ed. 1993).
13. Hugo Benı́tez-Silva, Moshe Buchinsky, Hiu Man Chan, John Rust & Sofia Sheidvasser,
An Empirical Analysis of the Social Security Disability Application, Appeal, and Award Process,
6 LABOUR ECON.147, 148 (1999).
14. 20 C.F.R. § 422.140.
15. Id.
16. Benítez-Silva et al., supra note 1, at 2.
17. Id. at 7-8.
18. Id. at 8.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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his prior work or if he has the capacity to do any other work.21 If the
determination is made that the applicant has the capacity to do his prior
work or some other work, he will be denied benefits.22
After a denial at the reconsideration stage, the applicant may request a
hearing.23 An ALJ will either allow the hearing and make a determination
on the matter or deny the request for a hearing.24 The ALJ will base his
“decision on the preponderance of the evidence offered at the hearing or
otherwise included in the record.”25 Applicants, as a “party to a hearing
decision or dismissal, may request a review of such action by the Appeals
Council.”26 The Appeals Council will either deny the request for review,
remand the case back to the ALJ, or make a determination itself.27 Lastly,
the applicant may file a lawsuit against the Social Security Administration,
or its state counterpart, in federal court.28
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
Prior research in this area has noted a trend of inconsistencies both
vertically and horizontally within the SSA disability system. Benítez-Silva,
Buchinsky, and Rust found that only 38% of applicants are accepted at the
initial determination.29 They also found that only half of the applicants that
were denied at the initial stage request a reconsideration, and only 16% are
awarded benefits at the reconsideration stage.30 Of the applicants that
appeal to an ALJ, approximately 59% are awarded benefits.31 BenítezSilva, Buchinsky, Chan, Rust, and Sheidvasser found that the appeals
process “increases [an applicant’s] award probability from 46% to 73%.”32
These percentages are based upon federal application numbers and
responses from a Health and Retirement Survey, a national longitudinal
survey.33 This research not only demonstrates the disparity among the SSA
vertically, but it also shows the importance of the appeal itself.

21. Id. at 8-9.
22. Id.
23. 40 C.F.R. § 422.203.
24. Id. § 422.203(c).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 422.205.
27. See Lael R. Keiser, Street-level Bureaucrats, Administrative Power and the Manipulation
of Federal Social Security Disability Programs, 1 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 144, 160 n.1 (2001).
28. See id.
29. Benı́tez-Silva, et. al, supra note 1, at 9.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Benı́tez-Silva et al., supra note 13, at 147.
33. Id. at 153.

358

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:353

The SSA functions through many state bureaucracies.34 Other research
in this area has focused on the disparities among the award processes in the
SSA horizontally, focusing specifically on states and regions. Lael R.
Keiser found that variation exists among initial determinations made by
different states.35 The amount of discretion variation differs among streetThese variations indicate that the
level bureaucrats and ALJs.36
implementation of the federal rules and the award process are not uniform.
However, as Max Weber, a German philosopher, sociologist, and political
economist,37 explained, it is a “basic principle of bureaucratic administration . . . that implementation should be uniform.”38 It is clear that the SSA
is inconsistent in its application of the law, both vertically within the
disability awards system and horizontally in different regions and judicial
districts.39 These disparities have been prevalent for years, but the reason
for such variations has not yet been pinpointed.
A. CONCENTRATION ON STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
After noting these disparities, researchers have concentrated on the
implementation process at the street-level. In the SSA, initial disability
determinations are made by street-level bureaucrats known as DDS
workers.40 Michael Lipsky defined street-level bureaucrats as “public
service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their
jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work.”41
DDS decisions “also vary widely across states at a given point in time,
again in a manner that is difficult to ascribe entirely to differences in the
characteristic of the applicant pool.”42 Keiser explains that while the DDS
application stages have a strict set of eligibility requirements, “state
examiners retain considerable discretion because of the nature of [the SSA]

34. See Benıt́ ez-Silva et. al, supra note 1, at 2.
35. Keiser, supra note 27, at 149.
36. See id. at 148.
37. Max Weber, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/weber/.
38. Helena O Stensöta, Political Influence on Street-level Bureaucratic Outcome: Testing the
Interaction Between Bureaucratic Ideology and Local Community Political Orientation, 22 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 553, 553 (2012) (citing MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (Talcott parsons, ed. and trans., A.M. Henderson, trans., N.Y. Free
Press 1964) (1947).
39. Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 6, at 760.
40. Keiser, supra note 27, at 148.
41. Michael Lipsky, Street-level Bureaucracy: The Critical Role of Street-level Bureaucrats,
in CLASSICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 412, 419 (Jay M. Shafritz & Albert C. Hyde eds.,
2012).
42. Benítez-Silva et al., supra note 1, at 2.
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programs.”43 “The federal government has tried to control the decisions of
disability examiners by creating binding rules, but this has been difficult
because these bureaucrats work for the states” and retain a significant
amount of discretion.44 Therefore, because the street-level bureaucrats have
the power to determine for which of the many programs a claimant is
eligible, the “elected officials have an incentive to manipulate eligibility so
that as many claimants as possible qualify” for the state’s least expensive
program.45
Keiser’s 1999 study of the Social Security Administration’s DDS
workers explored “the impact of state level environmental characteristics on
the use of discretion.”46 Overall, Keiser concluded that “professional norms
play a large role in directing the ways that street-level bureaucrats use their
discretion” and “[w]hile the bureaucracy is professional, it is also
responsive to local political concerns.”47 In short, Keiser concluded that
“disability rates at the state level are a function of the economic
environment (unemployment rate), the task environment (aged population
and percent of employees working in manufacturing), and the political
environment (Democratic control of state legislatures).”48 Therefore, “it is
possible that street-level bureaucrats at the state level try to use the program
strategically but that their efforts are thwarted during the federal appeals
process.”49 This is especially true given the relatively high reversal rates by
ALJs.50
Keiser’s subsequent 2001 study further suggests that “given the
discretionary nature of the disability decisions, it is not surprising that
variation exists . . . among the states and within the same state from year to
year.”51 Keiser found that “street-level bureaucrats respond to the fiscal
incentives that exist for state government to manipulate access to these
programs.”52 Overall, her findings suggest “that when state governments
have a financial interest in whether applicants are given access to a
program, street-level state bureaucrats take these interests into account in

43. Keiser, supra note 27, at 148.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Keiser, supra note 9, at 87.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 100. It is important to note that Keiser’s statistics included the decisions from
ALJs, the Appeals Council, the federal district court, as well as the DDS worker’s decisions. Id.
at 102.
49. Id.
50. Benítez-Silva et al., supra note 13, at 152.
51. Keiser, supra note 27, at 149.
52. Id. at 158.
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their decision making.”53 More specifically, Keiser found that “the
governor’s party does not influence award rates” because the “programs
associated with Social Security tend to be supported by both parties more
than other anti-poverty programs.”54 Keiser also found that caseload
demand affects the award rate because “high demand reduces acceptance
rates due to resource shortages.”55
Keiser’s most recent study, produced in 2010, begins to delve into the
relationship between the vertical hierarchical actors within the SSA.56 In
seeking to understand the effect of face-to-face interactions on the award
rate, Keiser also studied “the impact of street-level bureaucrats’ individual
characteristics, such as their ideology, adherence to agency goals, attitude
towards clients, information about other bureau actors, and decision-making
speed, on how generously [DDS workers] apply eligibility rules.”57 Most
significantly, Keiser noted, “Examiners with knowledge of how many cases
administrative law judges overturn report about [six] percent higher
allowance rates than those without this knowledge.”58 This indicates that
simple information sharing about the ALJ reversal rate would enhance
consistency among agencies.59
B. CONCENTRATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
Other research has concentrated on or even blamed ALJs for these
discrepancies. For example, Richard Pierce argues that ALJs should be
eliminated because of the disparity among the initial determinations and the
ALJs’ reversal ratings.60 Pierce suggests that greater accuracy and
consistency would be achieved by relegating virtually all decision making
to state agency DDS’s paper review process.61 However, as already noted,
“[t]here are dramatic and unexplained variations among the state agencies

53. Id.
54. Id. at 157.
55. Id.
56. Keiser, supra note 11, at 247.
57. Id. at 248-54.
58. Id. at 253.
59. Id. Of note, here, Keiser begins to look at the interaction between ALJ and DDS
workers. However, overall Keiser’s study concentrates on how frontline workers implement
policy when they lack face-to-face contact with the applicants, and it spends very little time
delving into the relationship between ALJs and DDS workers.
60. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Should We Do About Social Security Disability Appeals?
Administrative Law Judges, Overruling SSA Rejections of Disability Claims, Contribute Heavily
to Federal Spending, 34 REGULATION 34, 34, 39-40 (2011).
61. Id.
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that handle initial and reconsideration decisions.”62 For example, “in 2010,
the DDS for Mississippi granted initial claims in 24.9% of cases,”
compared to New Hampshire’s DDS who granted initial claims in 49.5% of
the cases.63 Others believe that the switch to an all street-level review
process would not increase accuracy and consistency because “[s]tate
agency adjudicators handling the initial and reconsideration disability
determinations have considerably less training, education, and relevant
experience for the task than federal ALJs.”64
Even though judges and street-level bureaucrats often compose the
same welfare system, they have very different roles.65 A Social Security
ALJ must function within the framework of the SSA by following
regulations, appropriate precedents, and agencies policies. However,
“[d]ecisions rendered by the administrative law judges are governed in large
part by professional integrity, competency, and a sense of responsibility.”66
Hayes explains that an ALJ’s position is unique because “he has a dual
responsibility to safeguard the interests of both the claimant and the Federal
Government.”67 “This means that [the ALJ] is duty bound to see that
benefits are paid only to claimants who meet the requirements set out in the
law.”68
In contrast to much of Keiser’s work on street-level bureaucrats, Vicki
Lens seeks to understand the ways in which ALJs exercise discretion and
how it affects the adjudication of disputes between Social Security frontline
workers and applicants.69 Lens compares frontline workers and ALJs.70
She explains that frontline decision makers exercise very little discretion
because they focus “on processing information accurately, efficiently, and
consistently.”71 In contrast, ALJs “have the autonomy, professional knowledge, and skills to make individualized and complex determinations.”72
ALJs are unique because not only are they judges, they are also

62. Jon C. Dubin & Robert E. Rains, Scapegoating Social Security Disability Claimants (and
the Judges Who Evaluate Them), AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR LAW AND POL’Y ISSUE BRIEF, Mar.
2012, at 1, 4.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Vicki Lens, Judge or Bureaucrat? How Administrative Law Judges Exercise Discretion
in Welfare Bureaucracies, 86 SOC. SERV. REV. 269, 271 (2012).
66. Gerald Hayes, Social Security Disability and the Administrative Law Judge, 17 A.F. L.
REV. 73, 76 (1975).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Lens, supra note 65, at 269.
70. Id. at 269-70.
71. Id. at 270.
72. Id.
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bureaucratic actors who perform within a bureaucracy. 73 Therefore, Lens
tries to understand “how administrative law judges exercise the discretion
granted them by their professional training and their role in the bureaucracy.”74
Lens was not the first to focus on ALJs’ role in the awards process. As
early as 1975, Champagne and Danube sought to understand the
inconsistencies among the reversal rates of ALJs by exploring “the
relationship between administrative law judges’ characteristics and their
decisions.”75 They sent out questionnaires to ALJs to determine whether
background and attitudinal variables had a role in administrative judicial
decision making.76 However, the background and attitude variables showed
little correlation with the difference in reversal rates.77 Most significantly
for this study, Champagne and Danube found that there was no correlation
between caseload and reversal rates.78 However, they did note that
“[p]erhaps the number of cases handled by an administrative law judge is
still manageable and allows him time to consider seriously all of his
decisions.”79
Champagne and Danube argue that one “explanation of the smaller role
of background and attitude is that administrative law judges are extremely
well qualified.”80 “[T]he role of patronage politics and other political
variables” is not as important in the selection of ALJs as it is for other
judges;81 therefore, this factor, along with the qualifications of ALJs, results
in a “more uniformly high degree of professionalism of administrative law
judges[, which] may account for the low correlation of reversal rates with
background and attitude variables.”82 They suggest that “[a]ny blatant bias
measured by such variables as party or religious affiliation possibly can be
overcome by the professionalism of administrative law judges.”83
Currently, “federal ALJs must be lawyers for at least seven years, pass an
examination, and then score competitively well after a series of interviews
to obtain one of these highly coveted jobs.”84
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Anthony Champagne & Amos Danube, An Empirical Analysis of Decisions of
Administrative Law Judges in the Social Security Disability Program, 64 GEO. L.J. 43, 45 (1975).
76. Id. at 45-46.
77. Id. at 50.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 50.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 50-51.
83. Id. at 51.
84. Dubin & Rains, supra note 62, at 4.
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Building on Champagne and Danube’s ideals of the professional judge,
Vicki Lens’s recent work categorizes the judges, seeking “to understand
how administrative law judges exercise the discretion granted them by their
professional training and their role in the bureaucracy.”85 Lens claims that
ALJs often follow one of two approaches.86 The “bureaucratic approach” is
when judges “use their discretion to replicate the norms and expectations of
bureaucratic decision making.”87 On the other hand, “judges may reinforce
their designated role as adjudicators of disputes and may safeguard against
arbitrary state actions” by using the “adjudicator approach.”88 Judges’
professional training allows them to scrutinize an agency’s practice and
procedures.89 Bureaucratic approach judges “predominately choose to align
themselves with the agency whose decisions they review.”90 In contrast,
adjudicator approach judges “continually challenge and scrutinize the
agency, emphasizing their neutrality and role as a judicial official.”91
Of significant note, Lens explains that welfare bureaucracies routinely
engage in excessive proceduralism, and as a consequence, cases that make
it to a hearing “often reflect this emphasis on procedural compliance.”92
This is an important factor to consider when comparing some states and
regions, in light of locations’ varying application volumes.93 Judges may
choose to ignore the procedural breaches and proceed to the merits of the
case.94 However, in highly populated areas, or at offices where the
workload is substantial, this excessive proceduralism affects the way in
which judges are allowed to frame their issues and decide cases.95 Lens
noted that suburban units have fewer defects and are more likely to proceed
with the substantive issues because their caseload is much smaller.96 In
contrast, urban units deal more frequently with procedural issues and rarely
get to exercise professional skills and discretion.97 This means that
“bureaucratic practices . . . shape the nature and quality of disputes” and the
judges’ choice of discretion at hearings.98 Therefore, this suggests that
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Lens, supra note 65, at 270.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 275-76.
See id. at 276.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id. at 277-78.
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there is a significant relationship between ALJs’ discretionary choices and
the discretionary actions of the street-level bureaucrats.
Lens’s study also begins to examine two types of ALJs in relation to
decision-making—by identifying two approaches to ALJ decisionmaking—namely, “Bureaucratic” judges and “Adjudicators.”99 Lens
explains how Bureaucratic judges and Adjudicators exercise role discretion
when making decisions and how that discretion will affect applicants in the
Social Security Administration.100 Bureaucratic judges will uphold the
decisions of their frontline workers.101 Adjudicators will often reverse the
decision, or in the very least, exercise individual autonomy and discretion to
strive towards justice for the applicants.102 However, Lens does not focus
on the reasons for which a judicial actor follows the adjudicative or
bureaucratic approach. There are adjudicators and bureaucratic ALJs
within the SSA, but perhaps geography and subsequent political nature or
individual political views play a role in judges’ strategic use of discretion.
C. THE NEXT STEPS
Benítez-Silva et al. concluded in their 1999 study that “the conditional
probability of being awarded benefits is more than 50% higher at the appeal
stage than at the initial application stage.”103 After this alarming
conclusion, the researchers suggest that future work should concentrate on
the cause of this variation.104 Many researches have tried to determine why
variations exist among different states at the street-level. For example, a
recent study by Lens concentrates on the different approaches ALJs use to
exercise varying discretion.105 A 1997 General Accounting Office Report
suggested that “the higher award rate for appealed cases is a result of the
combination of large backlogs and excessive leniency at the ALJ stage.”106
Benítez-Silva et al. suggest a future study is needed to determine “whether
the higher award rate for appealed cases is a result of this combination of
large backlogs and excessive leniency” or if it “is a result of valid reversals
due to excessive stringency and poor documentation of reasons for denials”
at the street-level bureaucrat stage.107

99. Id. at 287.
100. Id. at 287-88.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Benı́tez-Silva, supra note 13, at 170.
104. Id. at 170-71.
105. Lens, supra note 65, at 278.
106. Benı́tez-Silva, supra note 13, at 170-71.
107. Id.
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Most significantly, Lens’s findings suggest that there is a relationship
between the actions of the street-level bureaucrats and the discretion and
subsequent decisions of the ALJs,108 yet no such study has considered this
relationship. The variations continue to exist both vertically and horizontally among actors and among states in the SSA. Lack of conformity due
to the use of discretion among street-level bureaucrats and ALJs continues
to contribute to these variations.
Keiser suggests that managers can reduce inconsistencies between units
by sharing information and shaping perceptions of the preferences and
actions of actors in other units.109 If this is true, understanding the
relationship and the effects of street-level bureaucrats’ actions on ALJs
could help reduce these inconsistencies. Therefore, this study sets out to
understand this relationship and hopefully begins to fill in the gaps of the
existing research in order to reduce the inconsistencies within the SSA’s
award process both vertically and horizontally.
IV. METHODS & RESULTS
In the year 2011, 3,041,500 applicants requested social security
disability benefits.110 Of those 3,041,500 applicants, 1,031,023 (33%) were
awarded benefits.111 Only 321,015 (10.6%) applicants received a disposition from an ALJ.112 However, once appealed to the ALJ stage, applicants’ chances of receiving benefits increased to an average of 62.82%.113
ALJs grant appeals at a rate ranging from 39.8% in Delaware to 80.9% in
Hawaii.114 Overall, state award rates range from 26.1% in Connecticut to
49.3% in Washington D.C.115 In order to better assess these discrepancies,
the dependent variable in this study, the percent of awards ALJs are
responsible for granting, was calculated for each available state and the
District of Columbia.116
This study is based upon the current research regarding discrepancies
in the administration of awards by the SSA and the ongoing debate about

108. See generally, Lens, supra note 65.
109. Keiser, supra, note 11, at 253.
110. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SSI ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, 2012, at 115,
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ssi_asr/2012/ssi_asr12.pdf.
111. Id. at 125.
112. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE
SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 2012, at 2.75, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/
supplement/2012/supplement12.pdf.
113. This data is a mathematical average of the percentages found in Table A1, infra.
114. See infra Table A1.
115. See infra Table A1.
116. See infra Table A1.
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whether DDS workers or ALJs are to blame for these discrepancies. This
study utilizes six independent variables to determine their effect on the
percentage of awards ALJs are responsible for granting in each state.
Concentrating on potential DDS worker influences, this study includes a
dummy variable117 for whether the optional state supplement fund is
administered wholly or in part by the state. This study also includes
dummy variables for democratic control of the governorship and
democratic control of the state legislature. The study also includes
independent variables for both the DDS workers’ initial workload and the
ALJs’ workload. The model also includes an independent variable for the
percent appeals granted by ALJs in order to assess the ALJs’ tendency to
grant appeals as a factor in the percent of awards the ALJs are responsible
for awarding.
This study used ordinary least squares (“OLS”) multivariate
regression118 to analyze the data compiled from the SSA and other state
government websites. The OLS regression revealed relationships between
the states, their DDS workers, and ALJs. Controlling for the six
independent variables discussed above, the results are reported in the table
below.

117. A dummy variable (also known as a dichotomous or binary variable) is a variable which
assumes two values, zero and 1, and is created to represent an attribute of a given observation. A
value of 1 is typically associated with the presence of the attribute of interest and a value of 0 is
associated with its absence. For example, if the state supplement fund is funded either wholly or
in part by the state, this variable would assume a value of 1. If it was not funded by the state, this
variable would assume a value of 0.
118. Ordinary Least Squares multivariate regression is a generalized linear modeling
technique that may be used to model the impact of one or more variables on quantifiable outcomes
of interest. “Multivariate regression” indicates that multiple independent variables are present in
the model. OLS regressions are used to test the independent variables’ effect on the dependent
variable.
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Table 1. OLS Regression Results
Coefficient
Std. Error
(β)
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t-value

p-value
(sig.)

29.332

1.607

.116

1.140

-3.697

.001

10.540

3.209

.003

State Funded
and
-9.561
Administered

7.308

-1.308

.199

Democratic
Governor

.711

6.955

0.102

.919

Democratic
Legislative
Control

-5.934

7.739

-0.767

.448

.447

0.166

.869

Constant
47.145
Initial
Workload per -4.214
10,000
ALJ Workload
33.822
per 10,000

Percentage of
ALJ Appeals .074
Granted
n= 45

R2 = .324

Adj. R2 = F = 3.036
Sig (F) =
.217
(d.f. = 6, 0.016
38)

The overall results of the OLS regression were statistically
significant.119 Given the observed F score, the model suggests that the joint
explanatory power of the independent variables included in the model are
statistically significant. However, only two of the individual independent
variables have a relationship with the dependent variable. There is a
significant relationship between the percentage of awards the ALJs are
responsible for granting and the DDS worker’s initial workload. There is
also a significant relationship between the percentage of awards the ALJs
are responsible for granting and the ALJs’ workload.

119. “Statistical significance” refers to a result that is not attributed to chance. Here, it
means that the percentage of awards the ALJs are responsible for granting is attributable to the
effect of the independent variables included in the model and is extremely unlikely to result from
chance.
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V. ANALYSIS
The debate continues: Who is responsible for the discrepancies
between SSA reward levels and among state’s award rates? This study
used a model, which was developed to analyze the amount of awards that
the ALJs were responsible for awarding against the independent factors that
may affect the discretion of SSA agents. If the number of ALJ awards was
relatively high, it would indicate that there was a flaw at the beginning of
the award process that required correction. However, after looking at the
available states, it is evident that the percentage of awards that ALJs are
responsible for granting continues to differ among states. Since, the process
for determining awards at the initial determination and reconsideration
stages uses the same process and is uniform nationwide, the differing rates
of appeals awards does not suggest just one flaw in the system.
This study included independent variables utilized to focus on the DDS
workers’ involvement at the initial stages. The purpose of utilizing such
variables is to determine if something during the initial determination stage
affects the initial determination or if something biases the DDS workers
which would later cause a high reversal rate by the ALJs. For example, the
independent variable of state funding, which is the administration of
optional state funds both wholly or in part by the state, could potentially
influence DDS workers awarding benefits based upon a budget. As Keiser
suggested, DDS workers could be responsive to “fiscal incentives that exist
for state governments to manipulate access to the programs.”120 Keiser
found “that when state governments have a financial interest in whether
applicants are given access to a program, street-level state bureaucrats take
these interests into account in their decision making.”121 The model
indicates that there is no relationship between states controlling their own
funding and the likelihood that ALJs are responsible for awarding more
benefits. However, it is important to note that some states administer their
own optional funding either wholly or in part, but some states do not have
an optional funding program, and in some cases, the federal government
administers the state’s optional funding. This would indicate that a state’s
financial incentives do not necessarily influence DDS workers to deny
awards that would later be awarded by the ALJs.
However, this area should be explored further. This model only takes
into account whether or not the state has some influence in administering
state funds. It does not itself consider the amount of funds each state
contributes, the amount of control the states have in distributing the funds,
120. Keiser, supra note 27, at 158.
121. Id.
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or whether or not the states share distribution control with the federal
government; this data was not specifically available from the SSA
compilation files. However, if this data were analyzed, it may reveal a
relationship between DDS worker discretion and the amount of awards the
DDS workers are responsible for granting as Keiser initially suggested.122
Furthermore, this model lacked the data to determine how many awards
each individual state distributes at the initial determination stage by state.
This data would have been more useful in comparing DDS worker
discretion and ALJ discretion.
Next, the model considered the workload of DDS workers and the
percent of awards the ALJs were responsible for granting. The model
indicates that there is a negative relationship between the DDS workload
and the percentage of awards granted by ALJs. As the number of initial
applications increases by 10,000, the percentage of awards the ALJs are
responsible for granting decreases by 4.214 percent, all else held constant.
According to Keiser’s 2001 study findings, caseload demand affects the
award rate because “high demand reduces acceptance rates due to resource
shortages.”123 In contrast, this model suggests high caseload demands at the
initial determination level decrease the overall percent of awards that the
ALJs are responsible for awarding. This may suggest that the initial
workload of DDS workers causes the workers to award benefits at a higher
rate and err on the side of awarding benefits instead of later being
overturned by ALJs.
In contrast, the model also suggests that there is a positive relationship
between the ALJs’ workload and the percent of award the ALJs are
responsible for granting. As the number of appeals to ALJs increase by
10,000, the percentage of awards ALJs are responsible for awarding
increases by 33.882 percent, all else held constant. This seems counterintuitive, but it also appears that ALJs err on the side of granting appeals if
they are overworked. Champagne and Danube found that there was no
correlation between caseload and reversal rates.124 However, they did note
that “perhaps the number of cases handled by an administrative law judge is
still manageable and allows him time to consider seriously all of his
decisions.”125 Now, after twenty years have passed, it appears that the high
level of workload demand does affect ALJ award rates.

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 144.
Id. at 157.
Champagne & Danube, supra note 75, at 50.
Id.
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Therefore, it appears that as the workload of an individual increases,
whether the individual is a street-level bureaucrat or an ALJ, the likelihood
that one will error on the side of awarding benefits also increases. Overall,
the study indicates that workload may be an indication of a flaw in the
overall SSA benefit system that would account for the discrepancies
horizontally and vertically within the system.
As suggested by Lens, it appears that in SSA offices with substantial
workloads, excessive proceduralism affects how judges frame the issues
and decide cases.126 For example, lightly populated areas with smaller
workloads have fewer defects and are more likely to proceed to ALJ
hearings with the substantive issues.127 In contrast, highly populated areas
with an increased workload deal more frequently with procedural issues and
rarely get to exercise professional skills and discretion.128 Therefore, this
study indicates that there is a significant relationship between ALJs’
discretionary choices and the discretionary actions of the street-level
bureaucrats as Lens already suggested. This demonstrates that bureaucratic
practices shape the nature and quality of disputes and the judges’ use of
discretion at hearings.129 Still, workload as a factor creating inconsistencies
in the bureaucracies deserves further study, perhaps with a model that
concentrates not only on workload but also the amount of DDS workers and
ALJs handling the workload.
The model also considers political control of the states. The model
focuses, using dummy variables, on both the governor’s political affiliation
and the state legislative control. The idea behind this variable was to view
whether political control of either position of government persuaded DDS
workers to award more or less benefits to individuals due to influence by
Democrats. However, after running the regression, the results indicate that
political control does not have a relationship with the percent of awards that
ALJs are responsible for granting. Therefore, political control by the
governor and the state legislature does not appear to create bias or control
the DDS worker to either grant or deny applicants. As research suggests,
political control may not influence worker discretion because both parties
find advantages in awarding disability benefits to individuals in need.130
Lastly, the model considered the ALJs’ appeals award rate on its own
merits in order to control for ALJs who simply award appeals at a high rate,
absent any influence or relationship with the initial determination stages.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Lens, supra note 65, at 276.
Id. at 277.
Id.
See id. at 277-78.
Keiser, supra note 27, at 157.
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The results indicate that there is no relationship between the ALJ appeals
grant rate and the percentage of awards the ALJs were responsible for
granting by state. Although this may indicate that the ALJs’ award rate is
not a factor in determining the reversal of initial determinations, it may shed
some light on who is to blame for the discrepancies. The model suggests
there is no relationship between appeals granted and the overall grant of
awards by ALJ when considered with the states’ overall award rates. This
suggests that ALJs are not responsible for the high reversal rates and the
discrepancies among reversal rates by state.
VI. CONCLUSION
Variations continue to exist both vertically and horizontally among
actors and among states in the SSA. Lack of conformity due to the use of
discretion among street-level bureaucrats and ALJs continues to contribute
to these variations. Understanding the relationship and the effects of streetlevel bureaucrats’ actions on ALJs and vice versa may help reduce these
inconsistencies. Therefore, this study set out to understand these relationships and begins to fill in the gaps of the existing research in order to reduce
the inconsistencies within the SSA’s award process both vertically and
horizontally.
These discrepancies, especially the large amount of denials at the initial
determination stages, are not how the system should work. In order to
begin to see if these discrepancies are a strategy by the SSA to award less
benefits or to see if something in the administrative process is broken, this
study concentrated on specific factors. These factors included a state’s
political control, workload demands, and a state’s financial contributions to
benefits programs and their effect on the percent of awards ALJs are
responsible for granting.
After running an OLS regression, the study found that overall these
factors have an effect on the percent of awards ALJs are responsible for
granting. More specifically, the study found that the initial workload of
street-level bureaucrats has a negative relationship with the percent of
awards ALJs are responsible for granting. Furthermore, the study found
that the workload of ALJs has a positive relationship with the percent of
awards ALJs are responsible for granting. It appears that as the workload
of an individual increases, whether the individual is a street-level bureaucrat
or an administrative law judge, the likelihood that one will err on the side of
awarding benefits also increases. Overall, the study indicates that workload
may be an indication of a flaw in the overall SSA benefit system that would
account for the discrepancies horizontally and vertically within the system.
The study also eliminates factors such as political control, state contribution
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funds, and ALJs’ tendencies to award appeals at higher rates as factors that
influence or bias the system significantly.
This study is important for the SSA to consider in order to improve its
implementation of policy and functions of the administrative process.
These results are also important for actors within the SSA, so that they can
understand the relationships and the effects of those relationships with other
actors within the agencies. It can also shed light on why and how the SSA
makes decisions in order for attorneys and applicants to better make claims
and advocate for benefits. If these discrepancies are further explored, the
reason for the discrepancies can be pinpointed in order to correct any flaws
in the system. Once the system is fixed, it will not only save applicants’
benefits, time, inconvenience, and money, but it will also save the SSA
time, resources, and money.
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Appendix
Table A1: State Data Table
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Overall
(%)
36.1
40.2
29 8
32 5
36.1
35.7
26.1
26.4
49 3
33.9
31 6
38 3
33 3
29.4
31.9
30 5
36 3
31.7
32 6
29.2
30.4
34 3
36 5
35 6
28 5
31 5
34.9
32.4
33.2
41 3
40 3
34
38.4
30.4
28 3
32.2
29 8
34.4
33 8
33 5
30 5
30.2
36 3
34.7
38.4
33.7
34 8
40 5
32
31 8
34

Benefits

Awarded

Appeals Granted by ALJs
(%)
66 6
54
60.2
59.4
62.7
59 3
67 6
39 8
74.2
62.7
68 3
80.9

Benefits
Awarded
ALJ (%)
63.3
24.5
36.4
34
28.3
38.4
51.7
34.4
52.5
29.3
41.3
15.2

57.2
56.7
60
52.1
62 6
51.1
76 3
66
66.2
61 3
58.9
52.9
58.9
59 5
69.9
62.9
71.2
73.9
70.7
68 8
65.1
62 6
60.9
58 8
59 6
60 6
60.9
66 6

52.9
38.8
18.6
34.8
46
27.7
47.7
42.1
26
41.8
28.5
41.8
60.3
64.1
32.7
16.9
70
25.4
75.6
38.3
37.2
146.2
30.2
54.8
35.9
43
43.8
53.5

71 6
53.7
72.1

67.5
21.4
43.7

56.9
69.1
70.9
50.7

67
34
96.6
20.7

by

